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McPherson, James M. War on the Waters: The Union and Confederate Navies,
1861-1865. University of North Carolina Press, $35.00 ISBN
978-0-8078-3588-3
New Comprehensive Analysis of Civil War Naval History
In August 1863, Abraham Lincoln wrote to his long-time friend James
Conklin, summing up the US Navy’s all-encompassing role in the war effort.
While the president noted that the army had received most of the notable
accolades, Lincoln penned “Nor must Uncle Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At all
the watery margins they have been present. Not only on the deep sea, the broad
bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow muddy bayou, and wherever the
ground was a little damp, they have been, and made their tracks." Dr. James
McPherson, professor emeritus of history at Princeton, and a Pulitzer and
Lincoln Prize winning historian, reflects Lincoln’s sentiments. He believes that
the naval efforts have not received the attention they deserve and he assesses the
roles of the Union and Confederate navies during the Civil War.
Organizationally, McPherson divides the naval war into five overlapping
parts and he approaches the narrative in chronological fashion. He maintains that
the US Navy, in particular, deserves more credit for its wartime achievements
and notes that the armies garnered the public’s attention during the conflict and
cornered most of the historical writing afterwards. Due to this indifference, he
contends that Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut should get the same
recognition that generals William Tecumseh Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant each
have received for their prosecution of the war.
The navy served as a pivot for the Union’s war effort—the longer the war
lasted, the more force the sea service brought to bear on the Confederacy and the
more impact it had on the war’s outcome. The Union naval forces did score
some significant victories for the Union cause without the army’s
assistance—Cape Hatteras, Port Royal, New Orleans and Mobile Bay to mention
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a few. The service also realized notable defeats such as at Charleston and
Vicksburg. McPherson relates in some detail the story of the Charleston
campaign and the repulse of the ironclad fleet and the subsequent mired
campaign to capture the “cradle of secession." This exemplifies well, the
interservice rivalry and a lack of cooperation that cultivated a dysfunctional
relationship and limited the successes of the military branches. Illustrative as
well are instances in 1862, when the army would not make available troops
necessary to capture Vicksburg or the fortifications of Drewry’s Bluff. The navy
was prepared to operate against these strong positions and would have required
relatively few army resources to capture these points. Despite the fact that
victory was in the best interest of both military branches, the requests went
unfulfilled.
McPherson relates how, for the navy, it was truly a worldwide conflict. He
weaves into the narrative information on the most important international issues.
The Confederacy had agents in Europe to buy war material and to build a fleet of
commerce raiders, blockade runners, and warships. The world’s seaways were
also active with Confederate commerce raiders and the Union cruisers that
chased them around the globe. His account of the depredations of the raiders
Alabama and the Shenandoah reveals the reason for the “flight from the flag" of
American commercial vessels and the destruction of many more, including a
large percentage of the US whaling fleet. Also covered is the delicate issue of the
blockade at Matamoros.
McPherson also considers the leadership of both sides. Farragut comes out
well, but others such as Rear Admiral Samuel Francis DuPont did not. The
author gives both naval secretaries high marks for their work during the war. He
commends Gideon Welles for transforming the US Navy into one of the world’s
most powerful forces afloat by war’s end. Stephen Mallory rates well for his use
of innovation, technology and ingenuity to overcome the Union’s preponderance
of ships, men, and industrial capacity. Chronicled are the use of submarines,
mine warfare, ironclads and torpedo craft by the Confederates to diminish the
advantages of the Union navy and to set back the Union cause.
The author only minimally discusses the blockade, the raison d'être for the
navy’s entry into the conflict. McPherson contends that the success of the Union
blockade be measured by the goods and war material the warships stopped by its
existence rather than how much commerce passed through the cordon of ships.
While relating that this was the primary task of the navy, the narrative never
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fully engages the reader with the scope and complexity of the blockade, the
assets required to sustain the ships on station, and how all this affected the naval
war effort. The author saves for the conclusion a discussion of the blockade’s
importance, but then in these final pages fails to balance this with the perspective
of the navy’s incredibly important operational work with the army, something he
discussed throughout most of the book.
The naval component was an integral part of the larger struggle and the ebb
and flow of the war on the battlefields continually influenced the decisions made
by the leaders of both navies. The narrative would have been more complete if
the author had better explained how the naval operations correlated to the overall
war effort. For example, we know from the text that Wilmington, North Carolina
and Mobile, Alabama were both important naval targets early in the war. Joint
operations against these important blockade running ports, however, did not
occur until late in the war. McPherson never relates that the attacks languished
until the army wanted to use these ports as potential bases for its operations.
McPherson’s book is well researched and enjoyable to read. His main
reliance on primary sources helps flesh out the story with first-hand accounts.
The good illustrative maps throughout are extremely helpful. His overarching
goal was to show how the navies shaped the outcome of the war. His argument
that the Union navy gave the United States a great value, comparing its actual
cost in men and budget, matched to the army’s resources, is on point. The
Confederates on the other hand did the best with what they had. Generally,
McPherson feels that the US Navy did not win the war, but that the Union would
have lost the war without its naval arm. This is the best single volume available
to acquire a cogent overview of the Civil War at sea, and the place for readers to
begin their quest to learn about Abraham Lincoln’s “webbed feet."
Robert M. Browning Jr. is a historian with the United States Coast Guard.
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